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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12 Plaintiff,
13 v.
14 MICHAEL JOSEPH ORTEGA,
15 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-118-NONE-SKO
16
17 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
18 TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
19 FINDINGS AND ORDER
20
21 DATE: September 21, 2020
22 TIME: 1:00 p.m.
23 COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

24 This case is set for status conference on September 21, 2020. On May 13, 2020, this Court
25 issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further
26 notice. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.
27 Further, pursuant to General Order 611 and 620, this Court's declaration of judicial emergency under 18
28 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council's Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court's
judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after
May 1, 2020.¹

24 Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has
25 emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive

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27 ¹ A judge "may order case-by-case exceptions" at the discretion of that judge "or upon the
request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order
will impact court staff and operations." General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020).

1 openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case.
2 *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no
3 exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.*
4 at 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
5 judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either
6 orally or in writing”).

7 Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory
8 and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, 618, and 620 and the subsequent declaration of judicial
9 emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the
10 judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such
11 action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. §
12 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the
13 case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of
14 such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” *Id.*

15 The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.”
16 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address
17 continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has
18 discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-
19 week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d
20 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed.
21 *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to
22 exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency).
23 The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated
24 by the statutory rules.

25 In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following
26 case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-
27 justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).² If continued, this Court should designate a new date

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² The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make

1 for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any
2 pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

3 **STIPULATION**

4 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and
5 through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

6 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 21, 2020.

7 2. By this stipulation, defendant and government now move to continue the status
8 conference until November 30, 2020, and to exclude time between September 21, 2020, and November
9 30, 2020, under Local Code T4.

10 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

11 a) The government has represented that initial discovery in this case includes
12 investigative reports and photographs. A portion of this discovery has been either produced
13 directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. The government is in the
14 process of making additional discovery available to the defense. .

15 b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery, conduct
16 investigation, and engage in plea negotiations.

17 c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested
18 continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking
19 into account the exercise of due diligence.

20 d) The government agrees with the continuance request and does not object to the
21 continuance.

22 e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the
23 case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the
24 original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

25 f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,

26 “additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D.
27 Cal. March 18, 2020).

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 21, 2020 to November 30, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: September 16, 2020

McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney

/s/ LAUREL J. MONTOYA
LAUREL J. MONTOYA
Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: September 16, 2020

/s/ JOHN F. GARLAND
JOHN F. GARLAND
Counsel for Defendant
MICHAEL JOSEPH ORTEGA

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 16, 2020

/s/ *Sheila K. Oberlo*
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE